Security against jamming and noise exclusion in imaging by Roga, Wojciech & Jeffers, John
Security against jamming and noise exclusion in imaging
Wojciech Roga and John Jeffers∗
SUPA, Department of Physics, University of Strathclyde, John Anderson Building, 107 Rottenrow,
Glasgow G4 0NG, UK
October 20, 2018
Abstract
We describe a protocol by which an imaging system could be protected against jamming by a malevolent party.
Our protocol not only allows recognition of the jamming, but also allows for the recovery of the true image from
the jammed one. We apply the method to jamming of quantum ghost imaging, for which the jamming detection
probability is increased when the imaging light is entangled. The method can also be used to provide image recovery
in general noisy environments.
1 Introduction
Image security is a challenge that arises when spatial information about an object is transferred to and imaged by a
device at a remote location. It is more important when receiving particular images implies related actions. Security
cannot normally be guaranteed along the entire path between the source of light and the detectors. Imagine a situation
in which an intruder places a false object in front of the real one, or alternatively changes the path of a beam to direct
it via a false object. There is no protection from such tampering. Thus when we simply point a camera we can not be
sure whether or not the light received bears any relation to any real object. Someone may simply send us the image
that they want us to see. Of course we can provide more confidence by controlling of the source of radiation as well as
the detector, as is done in radar or lidar systems, but the fundamental point is that imaging is insecure.
Quantum protocols have been applied to imaging and communication, providing several advantages [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6].
Among them are detection of imaging jamming and appropriate protection [7, 8]. In communication situations we can
use encryption to safeguard information in transit. This typically relies on secure key-sharing protocols, an example
of which is quantum key distribution [9, 10, 11, 12]. When this procedure succeeds two parties share a secrete key
and only limited private information can leak to an eavesdropper. In imaging, however, the privacy condition is not
normally crucial. We simply care that the image received exactly corresponds to the object. This is an example of
public communication in which we stress the correctness of the message or image instead of its privacy. We face
not an eavesdropper but an active intruder, who may already know the object and, instead, wants to jam the imaging
protocol, changing information and consequently perhaps a strategic decision.
As already stated, there is no secure protection from an intruder who uses a false object or a false beam path. It may,
however, be difficult for the intruder to perform such jamming both efficiently and undetectably. Thus we investigate
a weaker jamming procedure in which some of the light from a trusted source of illumination is intercepted by the
intruder and replaced by light from their independent source [13, 14, 15]. As the party who prepares states of light has
naturally more information about the states than it is possible to extract from a measurement, the legitimate imager has
an informational advantage over the intruder. This advantage can be a source of imaging security as we show in this
paper.
The paper is organised as follows. In Sec. 2, we analyse the general image security scenario and provide a universal
description of intruder detection and correct image recovery. Our protocol applies to both deliberate jamming and to
image noise. In Sec. 3, we define a quantitative criterion for image comparison that enables us to estimate the
probability that we detect jamming and a false alarm probability. In Sec. 4, we propose an arrangement of ghost
imaging [1, 16, 19, 17, 18] protected against such jamming by using both classical and quantum-correlated light.
Here, we show an advantage of using the quantum-correlated light and demonstrate the recovery protocol. Finally,
concluding remarks and possible extensions of these work are discussed in Sec. 5.
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2 Universal intrusion detection and image recovery protocol
Let us start with a general description of imaging protected by a security system that allows us to both detect the
presence of an intruder and to counter the effect of jamming. We note at the outset that there is nothing specifically
quantum about our procedure. It can be performed with classical light. There can sometimes be advantages, however,
to using certain types of quantum state.
We assume that states of light ρ(x, κ) used to image an object are characterized by spatial coordinates x describing
the coordinates of light during the procedure together with another degree of freedom κ that is used to detect intrusion
and recover the image. In this paper κ denotes a polarisation state, however all the results could apply to other
degrees of freedom. Suppose that states produced by a trusted source interact with an object and therefore carry
information about it. These states are denoted ρj(x, κ), where j indicates that the legitimate imager can choose from
a set containing more than one state of light for imaging. Indeed, this diversification is crucial to the protocol.
An intruder intercepts a fraction r of the light and resends their own photons in state ρE(x, κ′). Superscript E
refers to an intruder or jammer or simply a noisy environment that introduces errors. We assume that the state selected
by the intruder does not depend on the choice of j made randomly by the imagers and is, at least on average, constant
in time. This is a reasonable assumption because in imaging the dynamics of the process is not typically relevant.
We will discuss this condition further in the context of particular implementations. In the final part of the paper we
comment on the situation in which it is partially relaxed, i.e. the state of the intruder changes in time in such a way
that a partial correlation between ρE(x, κ′) and j is established.
The intrusion detection and image recovery arrangement contains a set of polarisation analysers. The analysing
system induces the detectors to make a measurement of κ by filtering, characterised by a set of parameters {θi}, which
in our case denotes the set of angles of different polarisers. We consider a general situation of multi-photon coincidence
imaging with n photons involved in which i = 1, ..., n. A spatial distribution of intensities in an image is proportional
to probabilities corresponding to an n-photon polarisation state ρ = ρ(x, κ) which depend on the analyser angles θi
and are given by
P ({θi}, ρ) =
(
〈a(θ1)| ⊗ ...⊗ 〈a(θn)|
)
ρ
(
|a(θ1)〉 ⊗ ...⊗ |a(θn)〉
)
. (1)
This is a probability if ρ is a state with exactly n-photons, otherwise it is an expectation value. Here, for a single
analyser and fixed basis of horizontal-vertical polarisations, |a(θi)〉 = cos θi|↔〉 + sin θi| l〉. The state of the entire
system, before any action of the analysers can be written as (1− r)ρj + rρE . The intensity distributions of images are
proportional to
(1− r)P ({θi}, ρj) + rP
({θi}, ρE) . (2)
Here several images indexed by j and i are obtained. If the intensity dependence of the received images corresponds
to the distribution P ({θi}, ρj), which is known only to the imager, then we can infer that there is no intrusion. If not,
intrusion is detected and, if it is only partial (r < 1), the correct image can be recovered, as we now show.
As an example assume that imager uses two different states of polarisation, so j = 1, 2. The contribution of the
intruder ρE does not depend on j so the detected images (1−r)P ({θi}, ρ1)+rP
({θi}, ρE) and (1−r)P ({θi}, ρ2)+
rP
({θi}, ρE) have the same contribution to the image induced by the intruder. If the contribution from P ({θi}, ρ1)
is different to the contribution from P ({θi}, ρ2) the absolute value of the difference between the two images for any
i eliminates any incorrect part of the image while merely attenuating any correct part because the difference of the
images is taken. This procedure allows us to distill a correct, although attenuated, image of the investigated object.
3 Quantitative comparison of images
3.1 Probability of jamming detection
An essential part of the detection protocol is based on the ability of legitimate imagers to distinguish between images
formed by two kinds of state characterised by different polarisation degrees of freedom. In order to compare images
quantitatively we define a state dependent visibility V that for given pair of polarisation states ρ1 and ρ2 and for a given
set of analyser orientation angles {θi} is given by
V (ρ1, ρ2, {θi}) = |P1 − P2|
P1 + P2
, (3)
where P1 and P2 are photon detection probabilities for states ρ1 and ρ2 respectively as in (1). Although, for brevity,
we omit the arguments of Pj in our notation, we assume that Pj = Pj ({θi}, ρj) i.e. Pj is defined for a specific state
2
and for a chosen set of analyser angles. Notice that for ρ1 = ρ2 the state dependent visibility vanishes, showing that
the images are identical. If, instead, for two different states V 6= 0 it means that intensity distributions of two images
are different.
As the legitimate imagers know both the states used and the analyser orientations in ideal conditions without
intrusion they expect to observe images of a particular state dependent visibility. Any noise or intrusion will reduce
the observed visibility.
The measured and expected visibilities provide data for hypotheses testing based on the likelihood ratio test [20,
13]. Our null hypothesisH0 assumes no intruder while the alternative hypothesisH1 assumes the presence of intercept-
resend jamming. We must also account for real devices having some level of noise. Let us assume that the measured
visibilities are associated with the Gaussian noise of variance σ and test the hypotheses based on the likelihood ratio test
with prior probabilities 0.5 (and the test threshold λ = 1). Visibilities related to the two hypotheses are the following:
for H0 we have s0 = V0 +N and for H1, s1 = V1 +N where V0 and V1 are the average values of the visibilities and
N is the Gaussian noise with variance σ. In the log-likelihood ratio test we decide that H0 occurs if∑
i
s˜i <
lnλ
d
+
d
2
, (4)
where s˜i = si/(σ
√
M), and M is a number of trials which we will assume to be 1. Here d =
√
M(V1 − V0)/σ. A
corresponding inequality to Ineq. (4) convinces us to accept H1. The probability of correct detection of an intruder
(i.e. when H1 is correctly accepted) and the false alarm probabilities are
Pd = erfc
[
lnλ
d
− d
2
]
, (5)
Perr = erfc
[
lnλ
d
+
d
2
]
, (6)
and erfc[x] denotes the complimentary error function [20].
3.2 Application of the detection strategy, level of jamming
In order to demonstrate the optimal decision strategy made by the legitimate imagers let us consider the attack in which
the intruder intercepts a fraction r of the original photons and replaces them with photons in a state ρE carrying the
false image.
As the intruder detection probability (5) is a monotonic function of the difference between expected and observed
state dependent visibilities, the intruder will choose states carrying false information such that this difference is as
small as possible. The legitimate imagers have freedom in the choice of analyser angles and will want to maximise
this difference. In principle, the intruder could optimize their state for each value of {θi}. Although it is unlikely, the
legitimate imagers can consider this situation in order to check the robustness of their state choice against jamming.
Thus they are able to decide the states for which the detectability of an intruder is largest. Hence in the worst case
scenario the detection probability (5) is a monotonic function of
d =
1
σ
max
{θi}
[
min
ρE
(
V (ρ1, ρ2, {θi})− V (ρ′1, ρ′2, {θi})
)]
, (7)
where ρ1 and ρ2 are the states chosen by the legitimate imagers and
ρ′j = (1− r)ρj + rρE , where j = 1, 2 (8)
are the states carrying false information. The parameter d is estimated for a given level of intrusion. In cryptography
a similar parameter is given by a secrecy function [21]. For image comparison we introduce the level of jamming in
terms of the state dependent visibility for jammed and non-jammed images
VL = max
j
V (ρj , ρ
′
j , {θi}), (9)
where ρj means the state from legitimate source and ρ′j = (1 − r)ρj + rρE its jammed counterpart. The level of
jamming VL quantitatively describes how at most the actual image can differ from the correct one in visibility. In
principle, as a measure of the intrusion level we could consider the intercepting rate r. However, this is not the optimal
choice, as even for large r the correct image may be attenuated but not changed as is shown in the following example.
3
Example. One photon states. Imagine that the states chosen by legitimate parties are ρ1 = | ↔〉〈↔ | and ρ2 = | l〉〈l |.
We assume that ρE can be an arbitrary one photon polarisation pure state ρE = |φ〉〈φ|, where |φ〉 = cosα| ↔
〉+ eiβ sinα| l〉, for arbitrary real α and β. It is easy to show that in this case
V (ρ′1, ρ
′
2, θ) =
(1− r)V (ρ1, ρ2, θ)
1− r + r〈a(θ)|ρE |a(θ)〉 , (10)
where ρ′i are given by
ρ′j = (1− r)ρj + rρE , where j = 1, 2. (11)
Thus for each θ the intruder can find a state ρE orthogonal to |a(θ)〉. Hence, for any intercepting rate r the parameter
d = 0 and the probability of detection is as small as possible, equal to the probability of an unbiased guess 0.5.
However, notice that although the interference of the intruder is significant, the image is not changed apart from being
attenuated. Because we stress the correctness of the image rather than its intensity, which we do not fully control, this
invasion is not treated as jamming. Therefore, we do not treat r as a proper characterisation of the degree of jamming.
4 Ghost imaging jamming
In ghost imaging correlations between photons in two separate light beams, which we call the object beam and the
image beam, allow an image of an object to be obtained by detecting light that has never interacted with it directly.
The object beam interacts with an object with a particular spatial profile. This beam is detected with a bucket detector
that provides no spatial information. The image beam does not interact with the object but falls on a spatially resolving
detector. An image appears at this detector due to coincidence correlations between two detectors. The technique has
applications for example, for difficult to access objects where a single pixel detector might be easier to place, or if it
is easier to detect spatial images at one wavelength rather than another [17, 18]. The correlations also provide timing
information.
4.1 Probability of jamming detection in ghost imaging
In what follows we describe the detection and recovery protocol applied to ghost imaging. This two-photon coincidence
imaging allows us additionally to show that imaging with entangled states can increase the probability of intrusion
detection compared to classically correlated states.
A ghost imaging setup contains the following fundamental elements: a source of correlated photons, S, the investi-
gated object, Λ, a bucket detectorDL and a spatially-resolving detectorDR. These elements are shown in Fig. 1 which
is arranged in the so-called Klyshko picture [22, 23]. The central part of the setup is doubled, showing the symmetric
role of imagers (lower) and an intruder (upper). Polarisation analysers P1 and P2 can be rotated independently to
distinguish two angles θ1 and θ2 of polarisation filtering. Intruder E intercepts a fraction of the photons sent by trusted
source S and resends pairs of photons, correlated in polarisation, which carry false image information. We assume that
different photons from each pair travel through different arms and E intercepts photons from only one arm. This is
enough to prevent coincidence counting which can contribute to a correct image.
Figure 1: Ghost imaging with security. Intruder E intercepts part of a signal emitted by source S sent to an object Λ.
E re-sends correlated pairs of photons produced by source SE that carry information about a false object T to both
right and left detectors. Regions bordered by dotted lines denote zones controlled by imagers.
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Figure 2: (Color online.) Probability of intrusion detection (left panel) and false alarm probability (right panel) as a
function of the jamming level (7). The noise variance is σ = 0.1. The thin black, red dashed and thick blue lines
correspond to the legitimate imagers using two classical states (15) and (16), one entangled and one classical (13)
and (15) and two entangled states 13) and (14) respectively. For VL > 0.5 there is no significant difference between
imaging with classical and quantum states.
The states used by the legitimate imagers are changed at random. We assume that the intruder does not know
which of them was chosen, as the states have maximally mixed reduced states and cannot be distinguished by any local
measurement. Therefore, the states carrying the false part of the image the intruder resends are independent of the
choice by the legitimate imagers. For given angles of the analysers, legitimate imagers observe two images that have
the same contribution from the false image. The difference between these images allows them to recover the correct
image.
As we have already mentioned, the legitimate imagers use states with maximally mixed reduced states. All two-
photon polarisation states with maximal mixed reduced states can be transformed by local changes of bases to the
following class known as Bell diagonal states [24, 25]
ρBD =
1
4
+ µxσx ⊗ σx + µyσy ⊗ σy + µzσz ⊗ σz, (12)
where σx, σy and σz are three Pauli matrices, 1 is the identity matrix, µx, µy and µz are real parameters for which (12)
is positive semidefined. Examples of these states, that will be used are the following:
|ψ1〉= 1√
2
(| ↔↔〉+ | ll〉) for µx=µy=µz=1/4, (13)
|ψ2〉= 1√
2
(|↔↔〉−| ll〉) for µx=µy=−1
4
, µz=
1
4
, (14)
ω1=
1
2
(|ll〉〈ll|+|↔↔〉〈↔↔|) for µx=µy=0, µz= 1
4
, (15)
ω2=
1
2
(|↘↖↘↖〉〈↘↖↘↖|+|↙↗↙↗〉〈↙↗↙↗|) for µy=µz=0, µx= 1
4
, (16)
Here |l〉, |↔〉 and | ↘↖〉, | ↙↗〉 denote the vertical, horizontal, diagonal and antidiagonal polarisation states respectively.
The states (13) and (14) are entangled while the states (15) and (16) are classically correlated. The coincidence
detection probability for (12) is given by
PBD =
1
4
+ µx sin(2θ1) sin(2θ2) + µz cos(2θ1) cos(2θ2). (17)
The visibility difference d (7) and the detection probability (5) depend on the intruder’s set of possible states. We
assume that this set is given by (12). For pairs of states from the set (13)-(16) the probability of detection is plotted in
the left panel of Fig. 2 in the worst case scenario for different values of the level of jamming (9), while the probability
of false detection is plotted in the right panel. The value of the noise variance is chosen to be σ = 0.1. For pairs
of entangled states the detection probability is larger than for pairs of classically correlated states. In particular, for
a level of jamming VL = 0.1 the probability of jamming detection is about 0.82 when two classical states are used
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Figure 3: The upper left image shows the mixture of the correct (Λ-shape) and the false (T -shape) image obtained
using states (13) and (15) respectively. The upper right image shows the false image. In this case, the correct part
disappears because the legitimate states (14) are blocked by the polarisers. The lower left image shows the recovered
image. For comparison, the lower right image shows the image without jamming.
for legitimate imaging while Pd = 0.92 if entangled states are used. Preliminary numerical calculations show that
the situation does not change in the intruder’s favour if the intruder changes local bases of states (12). However, this
analysis requires further investigation.
4.2 Jamming detection probability and recovery protocol - example
A simulation of an example of the recovery protocol is illustrated in figure 3. Here, we assume that in order to
image a correct Λ-shaped object legitimate imagers use two classes of photons characterised by maximally entangled
polarisation states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 given by (13) and (14) respectively. During this process intercept-resend jamming
occurs with intercepting rate r = 0.5. A false T -shaped image is imposed on the correct one. In this example we study
a classical attack in which the false image is formed by photons in a classically correlated polarisation state ρE = ω1
given in (15). The number of photons used in the simulation in order to form one image in a unit of time is n = 105.
We assume that the detectors that are used for imaging record accidental counts, dark counts and other events that
contribute to general noise at rate 104 for the unit of time across all pixels, i.e. 10% of the number of photons.
The legitimate imagers chose polariser angles θ1 = θ2 = pi/4. The probability of the photons being detected
are given by Eq. (17). This choice of angles provides the maximum state dependent visibility for imaging without
jamming
V (ρ1, ρ2, {θi}) = 1, (18)
where ρ1 = |ψ1〉〈ψ1| and ρ2 = |ψ2〉〈ψ2|. The maximum value means that a correct image completely disappears
when the state of the imaging photons is changed from ρ1 to ρ2, as visualised in the upper panels of figure 3.
To estimate the probability of jamming detection we also calculate the state dependent visibility for jammed states
ρ′1 = (1− r)ρ1 + rρE and ρ′2 = (1− r)ρ2 + rρE . Here we calculate this quantity for the central region of the image
in which a part of the false ‘T’ is superimposed on the correct ‘Λ’. The visibility is
V (ρ′1, ρ
′
2, {θi}) = 0.5 (19)
and it can be measured experimentally. For an assumed variance of Gaussian noise σ = 0.1 the difference between
the visibility without intrusion and the one with jamming in units of σ is d = 5 which guarantees that we detect the
intrusion almost with certainty (Pd ≈ 1, see (5)).
According to the recovery protocol the correct image is obtained as the difference between two images from the
upper panels of figure 3. The recovered image is shown in the lower right panel of this figure, while in the lower left
panel we show the correct image obtained without jamming.
During the imaging process random external noise independent of the image is recorded by detectors. We can
observe that the noise level is reduced as an effect of our recovery protocol. Let us compare the levels of noise on two
lower images of figure 3. The average amount of dark counts per pixel is about 8.7 for the chosen unit of time in the
lower right panel. The level of noise in the case of the recovered image (the lower left panel) is about 5. The ratio
between the average brightness of the Λ-shaped area and the noise without jamming is about 14 while for the recovered
image this ratio is about 12. In consequence, the reduction of the absolute level of noise is observed in the simulation as
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an effect of the recovery protocol. The relative noise is increased due to a difference in brightness between the images
observed with or without jamming.
5 Concluding remarks and extensions
Imaging in which an imager controls the signal used to test a remote object is more robust than imaging relying on the
signal coming from the object or from an uncontrollable source. This control gives us the ability to detect jamming
and eliminate the jammed part of the image. We describe a detection and recovery protocol relying on the control
of the polarisation of light. The protocol can be applied to negate the effect of jamming by a malevolent party as
well as reducing the impact of background noise and signals on the imaging. Security of this protocol is provided
by the fundamental fact that the party who prepares quantum states has more information about the states than it is
possible to extract from a measurement. This creates an informational advantage of the legitimate imager with respect
to an intruder. The latter cannot perfectly correlate the false image carrying states of light with the states from a
legitimate source. As a consequence, the informational advantage can be used for false image detection and correct
image restoration, as is done in our protocol.
In the description of our protocol we assumed that the state of the intruder is stationary during the imaging process,
at least on average. This is a reasonable consequence of the assumption that the intruder does not distinguish between
states from the legitimate source and create correlations with the changes of these states. Let us consider the situation
in which this assumption is relaxed allowing for partial correlations between the intruder’s states and the states from
the legitimate source. Even in this case we are able to recognise the false contribution. It is enough to observe an
image that appears when a filter at the legitimate detector completely blocks one of the legitimate states. This situation
is shown in the upper right panel of fig. 3. The false image contribution still appears there. In this case, however, we
cannot use simple difference between two images corresponding to different legitimate states to recover the correct
image, since the brightness of the false image is now different on each of them. On the other hand, a modification of
the protocol, taking a weighted difference between the two images is still possible, which will allow us to correct for
this problem.
Free space application of the light beams together with the necessity of preservation of (or at least controlled inter-
action with) their polarisation states during imaging influences the conditions under which the protocol is applicable.
In particular, the distance of the imaging is limited. Therefore, protocols like this one may not necessarily be consid-
ered in the context of radar type imaging of remote unknown objects. Instead, as the robots and drones industry is
rapidly developed [26] they can be parts of modern surveillance systems with application of such proxy observers sent
to vulnerable places of an area being protected. In this example readout of the device is more trusted if controlled states
of light are used instead of the signal sent from the device in the border region between protected and uncontrollable
areas. The protocol can be also used when the robot is sent to view an object in a noisy environment, where direct
imaging is impossible. Another range of possible applications appears in the context of the general free space optical
communication [27].
Correlation imaging can provide further information. For example, due to timing information we can confirm if
beam path lengths are equal or have been changed as a consequence of jamming. We have shown here a further example
of the advantage to be gained by using quantum over classically correlated states in coincidence ghost imaging.
We have discussed the situation in which jamming photons were directed to the detectors through the analysing
polarisers. One alternative available to the intruder is jamming in which these photons are sent directly to the detectors
side-stepping the polarisation analysers. Then the probability of detection does not depend on the polarisation states.
As the intruder cannot optimize over these states the probability of intrusion detection is larger than in the case of
jamming through the analysers, so this is not a useful intrusion strategy.
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